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The Army must adjust to racial/ethnic demographic trends or risk losing the support of the American people and the nation's political institutions. By adjusting to these demographic trends, the Army will also benefit from the differing perspectives and skills people from diverse backgrounds offer as part of the organization. The Army's current recruiting, development, and retention systems do not provide for a continuing stream of senior leaders who mirror the racial/ethnic characteristics of the nation. Our senior political leaders have taken notice as evidenced by findings and requirements in recent National Defense Authorization Acts. While Army senior leadership has taken steps to address the challenges, the Army is still not on glide path to accommodate new demographic realities. There are several ways which the Army can immediately begin to adjust to these trends including establishing a long term objective to achieve racial/ethnic representation, reorganizing its diversity and inclusion staff, reaching out to establish non-traditional partnerships, and refining its current counseling, coaching and mentoring framework. Failure to adjust to demographic trends could result in loss of support and reduced influence as a national institution.
Achieving Army Senior Leader Racial/Ethnic Balance: A Long Term Approach
For the first time since the U.S. Army began keeping demographic statistics on its Brigadier General selection board, 100 percent of the colonels selected for promotion on its most recently released Brigadier General Active Component Category Selection Board were non-Hispanic white males. This comes at a time when the racial/ethnic diversification of American society is changing at its most rapid pace in history. To demonstrate the rapidity of this change, it's appropriate to note that the "new minorities --Hispanics, Asians, and other groups apart from whites, blacks and American Indians --account for all of the growth among the nation's child population. From 2000 to 2010, the population of white children declined by 4.3 million, while the population of Hispanic and Asian children grew by 5.5 million". 1 The Army must proactively and deliberately adjust to this new demographic reality and not assume that a natural course of events will solve its challenge. An Army with senior leaders whose racial and ethnic characteristics do not reflect the characteristics of the population it serves may lose the support of the people it is called upon to protect as well as the leadership of the country's governing institutions and risks diminished influence as a national institution. 4 While it is assumed that the promotion board processes are fair and consistently meet the needs of the Army, it is worthy to note that the overall selection rate to colonel among minority officers during these two respective boards was less than that of their white counterparts. In 2012, 40 percent of the eligible white population in the Active Component Category (Primary Zone) was selected to colonel compared to 27 percent of the eligible minority population. 5 In 2011, 38 percent of the eligible white population in the Primary Zone was selected for colonel compared to 30 percent of the minority population. 6 If these trends continue, the Army's flexibility to promote demographically representative officers to its most senior ranks will continue to decline at the same time the racial/ethnic diversification of the nation is rapidly
increasing. This will further exacerbate the already pronounced diversification challenge within future cohorts of Army senior leaders.
• Competition for hiring minority professionals: There is increasing competition to hire minority professionals from private, government, and non-profit sectors which, like us, are seeking to adjust to the new demographic realities. Since the private sector employs over 83% of the nation's workforce and has the greatest flexibility in hiring individuals, it is appropriate for the purpose of this research to primarily focus on the competition from this sector. The partnerships Walmart has established with leading minority group organizations such as the African American Associate Resource Group (Unity), the Asian Pacific Associates Network, the Associates for Disability Awareness and Education, the Hispanic Latino Association Resource Group, and the Tribal Voices organization have also facilitated rapid improvement to their recruitment, professional development, and retention efforts and serve as an example of a creative approach the Army could mirror in its racial/ethnic diversity efforts to be discussed later in this research. 10 Further exemplifying competition from private sector companies for talented leaders, it is worthy to note that Walmart is also a nationally recognized leader in hiring of military veterans through its "Careers With a Mission" program. 11 While this is good for our veterans seeking employment in a weak economy, these efforts and efforts of other corporations assertively adjusting to demographic realities, pose an additional 5 strain on the Army's retention of its best and brightest leaders, specifically its minority officers, during a time of decreased promotion rates.
• An increasingly diverse United States Congress: Our effectiveness in advising elected and other senior government officials who are increasingly representative of a diverse national population will depend upon the value we place on increasing diversity in our senior ranks. The 113 th Congress is the most racially and ethnically diverse Congress in our history. 12 For the first time, one of the caucuses (the Democrats in the House of Representatives) does not have a majority of white men.
Since congressional elections occur every two years, it is reasonable to infer that the diversification of Capital Hill (and its respective committees such as the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees) will refresh at a much faster rate than that of the Army's closed personnel system as it is structured now. This increasing racial/ethnic disparity between the Army and our nation's governing body potentially jeopardizes our ability to effectively interface with the leaders of our governing institutions at the strategic level.
• The timeline to produce a senior leader: We must include in our calculus the decades it takes to produce a senior leader in the Army. The racial and ethnic diversity of officers at accession directly correlates to the demographics of future senior leader cohorts. The desired time to produce a COL in the Army is 22 years (plus/minus a year) and the average time it takes to produce a Brigadier General is 26 years. 1314 Every year we delay making significant changes to the way we recruit, develop, and retain officers,
we add a year to an already major challenge of achieving reasonable racial/ethnic balance.
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The above factors taken as a whole directly (and potentially adversely) influence our racial/ethnic representation challenges within our senior ranks and demand that the While these are noteworthy actions and necessary steps to address the challenges ahead, they have not put us on trajectory to achieve a balance of racial/ethnic diversity in our senior ranks which parallels the projected pace and scope of change in the United States. This is best demonstrated by comparing the most recent national demographic data and projections against two current Army data points:
1. The diversity demographics of our current group of Active Component senior leaders, and, 2. The diversity demographics of our most recent cohort of newly commissioned Active Component officers (Year Group 2012).
1.
At the time of the 2010 census, non-Hispanic whites were 63.7 percent of the population; thus, minority group members were 36.3 percent of the population. 19 The Army's current population of colonels is 18 percent minority and the current population of general officers is 12.9 percent minority. Hispanic white Americans will be in the minority, the senior leadership of our Army at 9 that time could be around 80% non-Hispanic white when the national population is around 49% non-Hispanic white. And, this assumes the best case scenarios of future retention and promotion rates along current racial/ethnic representation which, if racial/ethnic promotion rates to colonel and brigadier general continue along historical trends, will not be the case.
As 
Establish a long term goal to increase diversity, and communicate the goal continually:
There is no short term, simple solution to this challenge. We should not completely force diversification at senior levels in the short term through selection and promotion quotas, potentially risking a threat to mission accomplishment in the long term. Primary selection criteria for promotion to senior leadership ranks in the Army should remain a candidate's demonstrated ability to serve at the strategic level in a complex operating environment. Additionally, assuming that the United States will not become engaged in a large scale and protracted war in the very near future, we should not consider lateral entry into Army senior leadership positions as a part of our equation
to solve this challenge in the short term.
Conversely, we cannot neglect our long term responsibility to increase racial/ethnic diversity among our senior ranks by only focusing on mission accomplishment in the short term. Not only would this fail to achieve the necessary racial/ethnic balance required to maintain support of the American public and of our political institutions, it would likewise potentially weaken the competency of our senior leadership by not embracing the many strengths of diversity as previously stated. While we should give more consideration to racial/ethnic selection rates during senior officer promotion boards in the near future, we must primarily pursue a balanced, comprehensive, and long term approach focused on the root causes of our racial/ethnic disparities in our officer corps at all ranks.
Our timetable is this: In addition to the time it takes to develop and implement new strategies, we should assume approximately 26 years to produce a colonel (from freshman cadet). Thus, our goal is set for the year 2040. This provides sufficient time to increase diversity among our officer corps through changes in our recruitment, development, and retention systems so that our junior colonels at that time will reasonably reflect the racial and ethnic mix of the U.S. population. While working towards this goal, we need to simultaneously increase awareness and commitment to the Army Diversity Roadmap by having dialogue at all levels of Army leadership centered on the document. This is an Army-wide effort which can no longer just be left to commands responsible for recruiting officers. To achieve synergy, Army leaders at all levels must understand the scope of the issue and embrace the mission, vision and goals set in the Army Diversity Roadmap. Additionally, in a deliberate and transparent effort to stay on glide path to achieve racial and ethnic balance by 2040, an annual report would be appropriate to communicate our diversity achievements and initiatives to all stakeholders internal and external to the Army. Feedback through counseling, coaching and mentoring significantly contributes to career development and translates into improved leader performance. 29 However, a recent doctoral thesis based on detailed interviews of 22 Army officers of all races/ethnicities spanning the ranks from lieutenant colonel to concluded that differences such as race, ethnicity, and culture are often significant barriers to the availability of mentorship and other forms of career guidance during an officer's career. 30 Furthermore, this thesis found that these barriers may result because individual officers generally prefer to engage in mentoring relationships with officers of the same race/ethnicity. 31 Assuming the overall fairness of the Army's promotion system, this cross-race mentorship shortfall may facilitate the perpetuation of hidden biases within the Army due to an unintentional lack of leader commitment to career development and feedback through counseling, coaching, and mentoring by officers representative of the racial/ethnic majority group to officers representative of racial/ethnic minority groups. Stated plainly, this shortfall could be a contributing factor to the smaller promotion rates among minority officers and contribute to the imbalance of racial/ethnic representation among our senior leaders. We should consider requiring senior officers of one race/ethnicity to counsel, coach, and perhaps mentor junior officers of another race/ethnicity on a regular basis. This should not take away from an officer's ability to personally seek informal mentoring relationships with respected individuals of their choice as currently described in current Army doctrine; however, it could augment that process by formally institutionalizing and improving the ability to perform these critical leadership tasks across all races and ethnicities.
Our Army is the strength of our Nation. As such, our senior leaders should adequately reflect the racial/ethnic diversity of the United States to ensure continued support of the population we defend as well as support of our nation's political institutions. Our society is rapidly changing, and in order for our Army keep pace, we must begin making comprehensive and enduring changes in our officer recruiting, development, and retention systems. 
